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abstract: McDowell rejects Davidson’s causal account of intentionality on the 
grounds that it cannot account for the normative features that essentially characterize 
states like belief and judgment . Curiously, however, McDowell never considers how 
Davidson’s theory of “triangulation,” which purports to explain normativity by ap-
peal to the social, rather than intentional, dimension of our thinking, might provide 
such an account . absent a reason for thinking that triangulation fails in this explana-
tory task, McDowell’s critique poses no substantial problem for Davidson . This essay 
aims to fill the gap in McDowell’s critique by arguing that neither triangulation, 
nor any similar account, can square a causal view of intentionality with an acknowl-
edgement of mental normativity . This difficulty gives those who are committed to 
normativity of the relevant sort good reasons to suspect that intentionality cannot 
be a strictly causal affair, and that something like McDowell’s “minimal empiricism” 
must be correct .
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In Mind and World, John McDowell frames his critique of Donald Davidson 
in terms of their respective responses to the Myth of the Given . McDowell 
understands the Myth as the conjunction of two claims: (1) that the ulti-
mate source of justification for our empirical beliefs is sensation, and (2) that 
unlike the beliefs they justify, sensations do not have propositional or con-
ceptual content . Davidson and McDowell both reject the Myth so defined, 
and for the same reason: justification is a logical relationship, and logical 
relationships can hold only between relata that are propositionally content-
ful . The fact, belief, or judgment that a circle is red can justify the belief that 
it is colored . But neither a red, circular sense-datum, nor an episode of being 
appeared to redly and circularly, nor the red circle itself, can justify anything . 
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If this is correct, then the Myth is self-contradictory; its account of the nature 
of sensation is inconsistent with its account of the epistemic role sensation 
plays .
Despite their shared rejection of the Myth of the Given, however, Dav-
idson and McDowell recommend precisely opposite strategies for moving 
past it . Davidson sees (2) as unavoidable and thus proposes that we reject (1) . 
He writes,
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations 
are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes . What then is the relation? The 
answer, I think, is obvious: the relation is causal . Sensations cause some beliefs 
and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs . But a causal explanation 
of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified . (1983, 143)
In lieu of the traditional empiricist picture he here rejects, Davidson pro-
poses a coherence theory of justification . He argues that when we properly 
understand the conditions under which beliefs are attributed – specifically, 
the “charitable” conditions of radical interpretation – we see that “belief is in 
its nature veridical,” and thus that a belief that coheres with a large body of 
other beliefs is justified by this very coherence (1983, 146) .
McDowell, by contrast, argues that it is (2) that needs to go . The real 
lesson to be learned from the mythical status of the Given, he contends, 
is that traditional empiricism has misunderstood the nature of perceptual 
experience by denying that its deliverances have propositional or conceptual 
content . He writes,
[We must] not deprive ourselves of “taking in how things are” as a description 
of what happens when one is not misled . In a particular experience in which 
one is not misled, what one takes in is that things are thus and so . That things 
are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content 
of a judgment if the subject decides to take the experience at face value . So it is 
conceptual content . But that things are thus and so is also, if one is not misled, 
an aspect of the layout of the world: it is how things are . Thus … experience 
enables the layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject 
thinks . (1994, 26)
While Davidson (1974b, 189) interprets the failure of the Myth as the failure 
of empiricism itself, McDowell’s contention is that once we see our way to a 
non-Mythical picture of perception – one according to which proposition-
ally structured states of affairs can be given directly in experience – we can 
unproblematically retain the “minimal empiricism” embodied in (1) .
Why should we think that this way of avoiding the Myth of the Given is 
more promising than Davidson’s alternative? McDowell’s answer to this ques-
tion is what interests me in this essay . His primary line of argument is that 
Davidson’s coherentism fails to appreciate, and thus fails to address, the wor-
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ries that have traditionally attracted empiricists to the Myth . McDowell notes 
that “the only motivation for the Myth of the Given that figures in David-
son’s thinking is a shallow skepticism, in which, taking it for granted that one 
has a body of beliefs, one worries about their credentials” (1994, 17), and he 
grants that Davidson’s coherence theory of justification may well be sufficient 
to respond to this worry . However, the most fundamental concerns that mo-
tivate empiricism (and which thus, traditionally, have motivated the Myth) 
are not about justification, but intentionality . Davidson’s coherentism offers 
nothing to address these concerns; in fact, it positively exacerbates them . The 
reason, McDowell argues, is that the idea of intentionality essentially involves 
certain normative notions, but these can find no home in Davidson’s strictly 
causal account of the relationship between mind and world . The problem 
with rejecting (1), then, is that it leaves us unable to explain how our beliefs 
can rightly be said to have content, and this is tantamount to leaving us un-
able to explain how any of our mental states can constitute beliefs at all .
I think McDowell has put his finger on an important difficulty fac-
ing not only Davidson’s coherentism, but any attempt to understand inten-
tionality in strictly causal terms . However, as we shall see momentarily, his 
argument fails to provide adequate support for this contention . Specifically, 
McDowell’s objection overlooks the possibility that, while beliefs have nor-
mative features essentially, they do not have these because they are essentially 
intentional, but for some other reason . This lacuna is especially surprising 
– and especially problematic – given that Davidson himself offers just such 
an explanation of where doxastic normativity comes from . under the head-
ing of “triangulation,” Davidson argues that it is the social dimension of the 
mental that endows beliefs with their normative features . If this is correct, 
then we can account for normativity perfectly well without having to suppose 
that intentionality is anything more than a causal affair . McDowell provides 
us with no reason – not in Mind and World nor anywhere else – to deny that 
triangulation is capable of carrying out this explanatory task .1 and absent 
such a reason, his critique of Davidson fails .
My aim in this essay is to fill the gap in McDowell’s argument by show-
ing that Davidson’s idea of triangulation cannot explain the normative di-
mension of belief, and that the reason it cannot do this is precisely that it 
assumes intentionality to be a strictly causal phenomenon . My discussion will 
proceed over four sections . In the first, I will articulate McDowell’s critique 
of Davidson and identify in greater detail why it fails to establish its conclu-
1 McDowell (2003) does offer some brief remarks that are critical of the idea of triangu-
lation, but his essay does not consider triangulation as a potential explanation of normativity 
and thus does not provide any arguments to the effect that it is incapable of providing such 
an account .
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sion . In the second I will spell out what I shall call Davidson’s “bold theory” 
of triangulation – the one he endorses through most of his career, and which 
purports to explain doxastic normativity – and in the third argue that it is un-
successful . In the final section I will consider the “cautious theory” of triangu-
lation that Davidson presents in two essays written near the end of his career . 
I will argue that the move from the bold to the cautious theory (a move that 
is plausibly seen as motivated by the very concerns identified in section three) 
leaves Davidson without a viable response to McDowell’s critique .
I
McDowell articulates his objection to Davidson most directly in the follow-
ing passage:
To make sense of the idea of a mental state’s or episode’s being directed towards 
the world, in the way in which, say, a belief or judgement is, we need to put 
the state or episode in a normative context . a belief or judgement to the effect 
that things are thus and so – a belief or judgement whose content (as we say) is 
that things are thus and so – must be a posture or stance that is correctly or in-
correctly adopted according to whether or not things are indeed thus and so . (If 
we can make sense of judgement or belief as directed towards the world in that 
way, other kinds of content-bearing postures or stances should easily fall into 
place .) This relation between mind and world is normative, then, in this sense: 
thinking that aims at judgement, or at the fixation of belief, is answerable to the 
world – to how things are – for whether or not it is correctly executed .
Now how should we elaborate the idea that our thinking is thus answer-
able to the world? In addressing this question, we might restrict our attention, 
at least tacitly, to thinking that is answerable to the empirical world; that is, 
answerable to how things are in so far as how things are is empirically accessible 
… and now, how can we understand the idea that our thinking is answerable to 
the empirical world, if not by way of the idea that our thinking is answerable to 
experience? How could a verdict from the empirical world – to which empirical 
thinking must be answerable if it is to be thinking at all – be delivered, if not 
by way of a verdict from (as W .V . Quine puts it) “the tribunal of experience”? 
(1994, xi–xii)
This argument is intended as a kind of “immanent critique” of Davidson . 
Davidson is antecedently committed to the central thesis (about the “norma-
tive context” which is required to make sense of belief ) of the first paragraph, 
but this claim, McDowell contends, entails the view of perceptual experi-
ence articulated in the second paragraph (experience as a “tribunal”) of which 
Davidson’s coherentism is an explicit denial . Let’s consider these claims in 
more detail .
What does it mean to say that a belief has some particular propositional 
content? What is it that makes, say, my belief that bananas contain potas-
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sium the belief that it is – namely my belief that bananas contain potassium 
– as opposed to my belief that the Cubs won the World Series last season or 
my belief that my butcher is not a space alien? McDowell offers an intuitive 
answer to this question: to specify the content of a belief is to specify what 
the world would have to be like for an agent to be right in holding that belief . 
My belief that bananas contain potassium is unique among my beliefs in that 
it is the only one such that I am right in holding just in case bananas contain 
calcium . Call this the “doxastic normativity” thesis . Stated generally, it looks 
like this:
Doxastic Normativity: an agent a’s belief B has the content that p iff: a 
is correct in holding B iff it is objectively the case that p .
This thesis is not uncontroversial (many proponents of pragmatic, coherence, 
or deflationary theories of truth, for example, would reject it), but I will not 
attempt to defend it here . It is sufficient for our purposes that Davidson ac-
cepts it .2
after identifying this point of common ground he shares with David-
son, McDowell restricts his focus specifically to empirical beliefs . This restric-
tion is perfectly allowable, since if Doxastic Normativity is true of beliefs in 
general, then a fortiori it is true of beliefs about the empirical world . McDow-
ell’s contention is that, when we focus our attention in this way, we see that 
Doxastic Normativity entails his minimally empiricist understanding of the 
nature of perceptual experience: the idea that experience constitutes a “tribu-
nal” through which the world itself passes a “verdict” on our thinking . In less 
metaphorical terms, we can define the view in this way:
Minimal Empiricism: The world is capable, through experience, of di-
rectly justifying (or falsifying) an agent’s empirical beliefs .
McDowell is less than fully clear about how we get from Doxastic Nor-
mativity to Minimal Empiricism, but the train of thought appears to be as 
follows: (a) Doxastic Normativity says that it is a belief ’s relationship to the 
world – not to other beliefs, or the interests of the agent, the customs of 
the agent’s community, etc . – that determines whether the belief is correct 
or incorrect . Since “correct” and “incorrect” are normative terms, it follows 
that (b) “the relation between mind and world is normative”, that mind and 
world stand in a distinctively normative type of relationship to one another . 
But what could this normative relation be? Causal relations are not normative 
ones . So (c) it seems the only plausible candidate is the one that minimal 
2 This interpretative claim is, I think, fairly uncontroversial . For evidence that Davidson 
does indeed affirm Doxastic Normativity, see especially Davidson (1982, 104) .
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empiricism identifies: that of the world justifying (or falsifying) beliefs via 
experience .3
The main problem with this argument is that it involves an equivocation 
on the term “normative relation .” In saying that “the relation of mind and 
world is normative”, one might mean simply that the normative question of 
whether a belief is correct or incorrect is settled by appeal to how things stand 
in the objective world . This rather weak claim does follow from Doxastic 
Normativity . McDowell, however, clearly means something more robust than 
this . The move from (b) to (c) requires the idea that mind and world stand in 
a certain kind of relationship – a “normative” kind that includes relations of 
“answerability” but excludes causal relations . Doxastic Normativity, however, 
does not entail this strong claim .
What has happened, I think, is that McDowell has unwittingly smug-
gled a contentious assumption into his argument . He is assuming that a be-
lief ’s relationship to the world must not only explain which of the pair of 
normative predicates, “correct” and “incorrect”, applies to it, but also explain 
why it is that such predicates are applicable in the first place . In other words, 
McDowell is assuming that the fact that a psychological state stands in a cer-
tain type of relation to reality must be what justifies us in placing that state 
within the “normative context” that renders it intelligible as a belief . Mc-
Dowell has not argued for this claim, and it is not obvious that it is true . one 
could accept Doxastic Normativity but deny that the relationship between 
an empirical belief and reality is norm-governed, holding instead that there 
is some other feature that all beliefs possess in virtue of which the relevant 
normative concepts apply to them .
McDowell’s argument, then, problematically assumes that empirical 
thinking can be subject to norms of the appropriate sort only if normativ-
3 Many of McDowell’s readers, including Davidson himself (see Davidson 1999, 107) 
have found this idea of the world itself justifying beliefs befuddling . Since space is limited, 
and because my focus in this paper is on McDowell’s critique of Davidson, rather than his 
alternative proposal, I will not attempt a detailed interpretation of the idea here . What I 
will say, though, is that it seems to me that this befuddlement stems from a failure by many 
of McDowell’s interpreters to appreciate how central his thesis of the “boundlessness of the 
conceptual” is to his account of intentionality and perceptual experience . McDowell’s claim 
is that the world itself – not just our takes on it – is conceptually structured . McDowell finds 
this idea echoed in the opening lines of the Tractatus: “The world is the totality of facts, not of 
things” (Wittgenstein 2003, 1 .1; cited in McDowell 2002, 173) . Since facts, unlike things, are 
propositionally structured, they can serve as justifiers of states like belief and judgment, and 
on McDowell’s view it is through experience that they become cognitively available to agents 
as such . Thus on McDowell’s view experiences are not episodes in which objects cause certain 
mental states, they are episodes in which facts present themselves to thinkers . What is most 
distinctive (and most controversial) about this account is not, in my view, the conception of 
experience, but the conception of what is experienced – of the world – that underlies it . It is a 
profoundly idealistic (in the Hegelian sense) picture .
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ity is built into intentionality itself . Moreover, the approach to explaining 
normativity that McDowell’s argument overlooks is not only a theoretical 
possibility; it is precisely the approach that Davidson himself employs . Trian-
gulation aims to show how the normative features of belief arise not from the 
mind-world relationship, but from the speaker-interpreter relationship . ac-
cording to this account, an isolated human being would causally respond to 
his environment just as the rest of us do, but the relevant normative concepts 
would not apply to him, and his psychological states would not count as 
beliefs . What makes us, but not him, thinkers is that we are engaged in com-
municative relations with others . Communication does not alter the nature 
of our commerce with objective reality – that remains merely causal – but it 
introduces a social context in which we can describe our own behavior and 
that of others in normative, intensional terms . If this “triangular” account 
succeeds, then Doxastic Normativity does not, as McDowell charges, pose 
any substantial problem for Davidson’s coherentism .
II
one way to understand the challenge that McDowell’s critique purports to 
pose to Davidson is in terms of the question: What distinguishes a creature 
who thinks – that is, who has propositional attitudes – from one who doesn’t? 
McDowell’s answer, as we have seen, is that the former, but not the latter, 
stands in a norm-governed intentional relationship to reality .4 Since David-
son rejects this answer, he owes us an alternative account . This is precisely 
what the idea of triangulation is supposed to provide .
More specifically, triangulation is supposed to dissolve an apparent con-
flict between two demands that, according to Davidson, any attempt to spec-
ify the difference between rational and non-rational animals must meet . The 
first of these follows from Doxastic Normativity: if a creature thinks, then 
it must be appropriate to describe at least some of its interactions with its 
environment (those which are expressive of its thoughts) in normative terms . 
It must make sense to call them “correct” or “incorrect .” Davidson develops 
this demand a step further .5 It is appropriate to describe a creature’s behavior 
as erroneous or correct, he argues, only if the creature herself is aware of the 
difference between error and accord . This requires that the creature grasp 
certain fundamental concepts . He writes,
4 McDowell (1994, 114–21) spells this out in terms of the distinction, borrowed from 
Gadamer (1989, 438–56), between being “embedded in an environment” and being “open 
to the world .”
5 McDowell, we may note, would agree with Davidson’s development of this point .
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To have a belief it is not enough to discriminate among aspects of the world, to 
behave in different ways in different circumstances; a snail or a periwinkle does 
this . Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between 
true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being . 
We can, of course, say that a sunflower has made a mistake if it turns towards 
an artificial light as if it were the sun, but we do not suppose the sunflower can 
think it has made a mistake, and so we do not attribute a belief to the sunflower . 
Someone who has a belief about the objective world – or anything else – must 
grasp the concept of objective truth, of what is the case independent of what he 
or she thinks . (1991, 209, Cf . 1982, 104–5)
Let’s call this interrelated cluster of concepts – error, truth, belief, and objec-
tivity – the “normative-intensional” concepts . Davidson’s claim is that we are 
warranted in judging that a creature is a possessor of propositional attitudes 
only if we are also justified in crediting him with a grasp of these concepts .
The second demand that Davidson places on our attempt to specify the 
difference between thinking and unthinking creatures stems from the con-
junction of his interpretationist account of meaning and his causal account 
of intentionality . according to the former, “what a fully informed interpreter 
could learn about what a speaker means is all there is to learn; the same 
goes for what the speaker believes” (1983, 148) . and, according to the latter, 
“what a fully informed interpreter could learn” is the total set of facts about 
a creature’s causally-prompted responses to environmental stimuli . Davidson 
is not a behaviorist; he does not think that statements about meaning or be-
lief can be reduced to statements about behavior (or, for that matter, to any 
non-intensional statements .) He does, however, hold that the evidential base 
that supports interpretive theories of meaning consists only of “behavioural 
or dispositional facts that can be described in ways that do not assume inter-
pretations,” that is, which can be described in non-intensional terms (1974a, 
148) . Thus whatever it is about thinking creatures that differentiates them 
from unthinking ones – whatever it is that warrants us in describing their 
psychological states in normative terms and in ascribing to them a grasp of 
the normative-intensional concepts – it must be something available from 
the third-person perspective of an interpreter . The facts that distinguish us 
from unthinking animals must be facts about our causal interactions with our 
environments .
These two demands appear to be in conflict with one another .6 If merely 
causal relationships are not norm-governed, then it seems that no facts about 
6 Simon Evnine (1991, 174–79) highlights this difficulty as a tension between two 
projects in which Davidson is simultaneously engaged, a “causal, explanatory” project and an 
“interpretive, hermeneutic project .” Evnine argues, as I am arguing here, that these two projects 
cannot be reconciled, though he offers somewhat different reasons for this conclusion .
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the obtaining of any such relationships between an organism and its environ-
ment could ever warrant us in describing its behavior in normative terms, 
and thus never warrant us in concluding that it is a thinker . Davidson sees 
this problem as a version of Wittgenstein’s oft-discussed “rule-following para-
dox .” He explains,
Suppose that each time I point at my nose you say “nose” . Then you have it 
right; you have gone on as before . Why do your verbal reactions count as “the 
same”, i .e ., as relevantly similar? Well, I count them as relevantly similar; I find 
the stimulus in each case the same, and the response the same . You must also, 
in some primitive sense, find my pointings similar; the evidence for this is your 
similar responses . But there is nothing in the offing to let you tell whether or 
not your reactions are relevantly similar . No matter what the stimuli, your simi-
lar reactions will indicate that you found something similar in the situations; 
and apparently dissimilar responses to the same stimulus can equally be taken to 
show that you took the stimulus to be different, or that for you this is a similar 
response . as Wittgenstein says, by yourself you can’t tell the difference between 
the situations seeming the same and being the same . (1994, 124)
The basic difficulty here is that your causally-prompted responses to stimuli 
support only the claim that you are exhibiting a certain disposition, but dis-
positions, on their own, have no normative import . one’s behavior cannot 
violate or accord with a disposition . Suppose I observe that you utter “nose” 
in response to my pointing at my nose ten consecutive times, and I form the 
hypothesis that you are following a rule stating that “nose” is to be applied 
only to noses . But then, on the eleventh pointing, I point to my ear, and you 
say “nose” again . Is this evidence that you have made an error? Not neces-
sarily . It might only reveal that my earlier hypothesis was incorrect . Perhaps 
“nose” in your language refers to any facial feature, or to all noses and ears, or 
to all noses and my ear . No matter how unexpected your responses, in each 
case some re-jiggering of my meaning hypothesis would entail that you have 
not deviated from your previous pattern, but only that the pattern was not 
what I had previously taken it to be . as Wittgenstein puts the point, “This 
was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because 
every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule . The answer 
was: if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then 
it can also be brought into conflict with it . and so there would be neither 
accord nor conflict here” (2009, sec . 201) .
Davidson’s “triangular” solution to the problem is similarly Wittgen-
steinian in spirit – or, at least, it accords with what many commentators 
have taken the spirit of Wittgenstein’s solution to be .7 Davidson argues that 
7 as we will discuss below (section IV), McDowell has a very different reading of the 
thrust of Wittgenstein’s reflections on the paradox .
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the paradox is operative only when we consider a speaker in isolation . If she 
occupies a social context of the relevant sort, however, then facts about her 
intersubjective relationships can support the claim that she is acting in ac-
cordance with a rule .
This solution is best understood as unfolding over two phases . In phase 
one, Davidson highlights the fact that, unlike the isolated creature, social 
creatures may be disposed to respond not only to objects and events in their 
environment, but also to the responses that others give to those objects and 
events . This “triangular” situation is what first opens up the space in which 
normative-intensional concepts can find a home . He writes,
Wittgenstein has suggested, or at least I take him to have suggested, that we 
would not have the concept of getting things wrong or right if it were not for 
our interactions with other people . The triangle I have described stands for the 
simplest interpersonal situation . In it two (or more) creatures correlate their 
own reactions to external phenomena with the reaction of the other . once these 
correlations are set up, each creature is in a position to expect the external phe-
nomena when it perceives the associated reaction of the other . What introduces 
the possibility of error is the occasional failure of the expectation; the reactions 
do not correlate . Wittgenstein expresses this idea when he talks of the differ-
ence between following a rule and merely thinking one is following a rule; he 
says that following a rule (getting things right) is at bottom a matter of doing 
as others do . of course, the others may sometimes be wrong . The point isn’t 
that consensus defines the concept of truth but that it creates the space for its 
application . (1997b, 129)
The difficulty encountered in the “nose” example was that neither I nor you 
had any standard by which to evaluate your behavior other than that behav-
ior itself . In the triangular situation, however, an external standard appears: 
we can judge the behavior of one speaker by reference to the behavior of the 
other . as Kathrin Glüer (2008, 1016) explains, “If the reactions of two crea-
tures to some kind of object or event normally agree, but on some particular 
occasion differ from each other, at least one of them deviates from the regu-
larity in their joint behavior . Such discrepancy is not sufficient to determine 
who is deviating, but … it is necessary for applying the concept of deviation 
at all .”
at times Davidson writes as if phase one were, on its own, enough to ac-
count for the normativity that characterizes belief .8 His considered opinion, 
8 For example, “If you and I can each correlate the other’s responses with the occur-
rence of a shared stimulus … an entirely new element is introduced . once the correlation is 
established it provides each of us with a ground for distinguishing the cases in which it fails . 
Failed natural inductions can now be taken as revealing a difference between getting it right 
and getting it wrong, going on as before, or deviating, having a grasp of the concepts of truth 
and falsity .” (1994, 124) 
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however, is that the mere existence of the triangular situation is not enough 
to account for thought . There are two reasons for this . The first is that the 
triangular situation is frequently realized among animals – Davidson men-
tions fish and monkeys – which we do not ordinarily credit with proposi-
tional thought (1997b, 128–30, 1997a, 141) . The second is that at the end 
of phase one we still have not fully escaped the rule-following paradox . When 
the triangular situation obtains, the behavior of one creature can function as 
a standard by which to evaluate the behavior of the other, but there is not yet 
any guarantee that it does so function . The second creature’s behavior consti-
tutes a norm for the first’s only if the first recognizes it as such . But the mere 
fact that the first creature reacts to the responses of the second does not entail 
that it recognizes these as providing a norm for her behavior . Because of this, 
we can conclude only that the existence of the triangular situation described 
in phase one is “necessary for thought … not sufficient” (Davidson 1997b, 
130, cf . 1992, 119) .
What more is needed? The answer, Davidson claims in phase two of 
the triangulation account, is that the interactions between the creatures in 
the triangular situation must be complex enough constitute communication 
(1992, 121, 1991, 209–10) . To communicate is not merely to emit sounds 
in the presence of another person, but to do so with the intention of being 
understood by the other person . Davidson argues that the introduction of 
such an intention has the effect of bestowing on the hearer’s expectations a 
normative force that they otherwise lack . To intend to be understood is to 
intend to be interpreted in a certain way by one’s audience . Interpretation, in 
turn, is at the most basic level a matter of the interpreter’s correlating types of 
utterances with types of stimuli . Interpretation proceeds unproblematically 
when the speaker gives responses that the interpreter finds similar to stimuli 
that she also finds similar, when the interpreter can match the speaker’s ut-
terances with their causes type for type . When the interpreter’s expectations 
concerning the speaker’s behavior are disappointed, then, understanding will 
be impaired . and this means that to the extent that the speaker’s behavior 
deviates from what the interpreter expects, the speaker’s intention to be un-
derstood will go unfulfilled . In this way, an interlocutor’s (informed9) ex-
pectations about how a speaker will respond to a given stimulus constitute a 
standard – a norm – by which to judge the success or failure of the speaker’s 
utterances . as Davidson writes, “The answer [to the problem posed by the 
rule-following paradox] is that the intention of a speaker to be interpreted 
9 obviously, the expectations of an interpreter who is largely unfamiliar with the speaker’s 
linguistic habits (one who is just getting started with the project of interpreting the speaker) 
will not be normative for that speaker . But, in this case, neither can the speaker and interpreter 
really be said to be communicating with one another . 
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in a certain way provides the “norm”; the speaker falls short of his intention 
if he fails to speak in such a way as to be understood as he intended” (1992, 
116, cf . 1994, 120) .
once this norm is operative – and only then – it makes sense to attribute 
a grasp of the concept of error (and thus also the other normative-intensional 
concepts that are required for thought) to a speaker in the triangular situa-
tion . Such a speaker must make use of the concept of error in her attempts to 
determine the extent to which she has realized her communicative intentions . 
She will look to the interpreter’s responses to her behavior to see whether the 
interpreter has attributed an error to her or not . and this can, in turn, lead 
her to apply this concept to herself – to recognize the possibility that her own 
beliefs are mistaken . as Maria Lasonen and Tomás Marvan explain,
What we might label “second-order reactions” – mutual reactions of two beings 
to each other – create a space for the observation that there is a gap between 
what one believes and what others believe, and this intersection of two points 
of view grounds the notion of objectivity … Suppose I utter a sound in the 
presence of an object, expecting things to go smoothly, expecting you to make 
a certain response . Surprisingly, a friction between our responses occurs . I am 
befuddled: was I wrong in thinking that the same object appeared? only when 
such an awareness of the discrepancy is present can the notion of objectivity 
arise . (2004, 183)
In this way, we arrive at the conclusion that Davidson needs to escape Mc-
Dowell’s critique: that “communication, and the knowledge of other minds 
that it presupposes, is the basis of our concept of objectivity, our recognition 
of a distinction between false and true belief ” (Davidson 1991, 217) .
III
Whatever insights Davidson’s triangular account of mental normativity might 
yield, it suffers from a fatal flaw: it presupposes what it is supposed to explain . 
Communicative intentions are intentions, and intentions are propositional 
attitudes . Thus we cannot informatively answer the question, in what con-
sists the difference between animals with propositional attitudes and those 
without, by citing the fact that the former intend to communicate something 
to another by their utterances while the latter do not . or, to state the prob-
lem differently: Davidson’s second demand was that the difference between 
thinking and unthinking creatures track some fact that is statable in non-in-
tensional terms, but the fact that some creature intends to be understood by 
an audience does not meet this requirement .
The objection that triangulation fails because it presupposes what it 
aims to explain is now fairly common in the secondary literature on David-
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son .10 But, while this objection is sound, it is not terribly illuminating . The 
objection shows that triangulation, at least as Davidson formulates it, does 
not succeed in reconciling Doxastic Normativity with a causal account of 
intentionality . But the objection does not entail, or even suggest, what Mc-
Dowell contends: that no such reconciliation is possible . after noting the ob-
jection, one might still think that in appealing to intentions in phase two of 
the triangulation argument, Davidson has simply given up too soon . Perhaps 
there is some other fact about social creatures that he has overlooked – one 
that is statable in non-intensional terms, and so not question-begging – that 
would justify the attribution of normative-intensional concepts to an agent . 
This, I want to argue, is not the case . But to see why not, we need to look at 
the problem Davidson faces from a slightly different angle .
To begin, we may note a distinction between two different kinds of con-
cepts: what we might call “inherently normative” and “merely discrimina-
tory” ones . The majority of the concepts we employ are of the second variety . 
If I have a grasp of the concept “elk,” for example, then I am prepared to 
distinguish elk from other kinds of items in my experience, to sort out the 
elk from, say, the moose and caribou . In some cases, of course, the fact that 
an animal happens to fall into the “elk” category will have positive or nega-
tive implications – if I am on an elk hunt, I will take it as a good thing that an 
animal in my vicinity falls into the category “elk” rather than “moose” – but 
there is clearly nothing normative in the concept “elk” itself . There is no sense 
in which an animal, qua animal, ought to be an elk rather than a swan or an 
alligator . The concept “elk” is essentially only discriminatory; it is simply one 
category among others that an item might fall into . The concepts of truth 
and falsity are also discriminatory – to judge that a belief is false is to place it 
in the category “false” rather than “true” – but there is more to it than this . 
“False” is not just one way a belief might happen to be alongside “true .”11 
unless I understand that false beliefs are erroneous, that “false” is a category a 
10 Pagin (2001), Bernecker (2013), and Glüer (2008) all present versions of this objec-
tion . However, in my opinion each of them arrives at this conclusion much too quickly . Pagin 
and Bernecker both suggest that Davidson endorses the solution to the rule-following para-
dox, commonly attributed to Wittgenstein, according to which the necessary social norm is 
provided by shared linguistic rules – Bernecker, for instance, refers to an implicit “agreement 
with a language community” – and then argues that agreement presupposes belief . The prob-
lem here is that Davidson explicitly rejects this “conventionalist” solution to the paradox and 
develops his own solution in explicit contrast to it (see especially Davidson 1992, 1994) . Glüer 
does not make this interpretive mistake, but neither, it seems, does she recognize the second 
phase of Davidson’s argument . She simply cites a passage illustrative of phase one and then ob-
serves that, so conceived, “triangulation involves the very capacities it was to make possible .”
11 This is the case only when we consider “true” and “false” as properties of attitudinal 
states like belief, assertion, and judgment . as purely semantic categories (i .e ., simply as proper-
ties of propositions that no one is affirming), “true” and “false” are merely discriminatory .
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belief, qua belief, ought not fall into, the category I am employing is not that 
of falsity at all . Concepts like “truth” and “falsity” (alongside, perhaps, others 
like “justification” and “consistency”) are inherently normative . They are, as 
Sellars (1962, 44) puts it, “fraught with ‘ought’ .”
a strictly causal account of the mind-world relation like the one David-
son endorses has, on the surface, at least, little difficulty in accounting for 
a creature’s possession of merely discriminatory concepts . To possess such a 
concept, on this view, is to be disposed to respond differentially to stimuli of 
a certain type . To say that I possess the concept “elk” is to say that there ex-
ist at least some circumstances in which the presence of an elk would elicit a 
unique response from me, a different one than would be elicited by a moose 
or a caribou . If I am conditioned to utter “There’s an elk” when, and only 
when, an elk is present, or, during elk season, to shoot only at elk and not at 
other animals, then I have the relevant concept . This is not simply because 
these behaviors are sufficient evidence that I have the concept, but because the 
disposition to exhibit them is the possession of the concept . The discrimina-
tion or categorization involved in possessing a concept occurs in and through 
my differentially responsive behavior .
However, as Davidson and McDowell jointly insist, merely producing 
certain differential responses is not sufficient to warrant attributing an entity 
with propositional attitudes . a thermostat regularly gives a definite type of re-
sponse to a definite type of event, but it does not think . In fact, on Davidson’s 
account not even dogs, whose patterns of response are exponentially more 
complex than those of thermostats, make the cut (see 1982) . as we have seen, 
Davidson argues that for a creature to have concepts at all, those concepts 
must belong to a wide network at the center of which are the concepts of ob-
jective truth and falsity . one way to put this is to say that for discriminatory 
behavior to count as the possession of a discriminatory concept, the creature 
whose behavior it is must be in possession of at least some concepts that are 
not merely discriminatory, but inherently normative (see Davidson 1997b, 
125, 2001c, 137, 1997a, 139) . The challenge McDowell’s critique poses to 
Davidson is that of finding room in a causal account of intentionality for the 
possession of concepts of this type .
Putting the challenge in these terms allows us to see more clearly why 
Davidson’s idea of triangulation is of no help in responding to it . as he 
presents it, the initial invocation of the triangular situation (phase one of 
the account) takes us at least part of the way toward explaining normativity, 
and the appeal to intentions (phase two) is needed only to complete the pic-
ture . But this rests on a confusion of the normative character of intensional 
concepts with their second-order character – that is, their status as concepts 
that apply only to other instances of applying concepts .12 a merely causal 
12 Lasonen and Marvan, in the passage cited above, make this mistake explicitly .
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story can explain a creature’s capacity for second-order discriminatory be-
havior, and it is plausible to think that social interaction would be at the 
heart of this explanation, since creatures typically do not respond to their 
own responses, but do respond to those of others . Phase one of the triangu-
lation account, perhaps, sheds some interesting light on this phenomenon, 
but in doing so it does not bring us even the slightest bit closer to an expla-
nation of normativity . Phase one, in other words, shows us how a creature 
disposed to a relatively simple pattern of differential response might acquire 
one of considerably greater complexity, but it does not reveal how normativ-
ity does, or even could, emerge out of this pattern . It is not until phase two 
that normativity is on the scene at all, but here, as we have seen, it is on the 
scene only because it has been presupposed . The account Davidson needs to 
provide falls entirely in the gap between the two phases . What is needed is 
some pattern of behavior, describable in merely causal terms and available to 
the third-person perspective of the radical interpreter, whose presence would 
indicate that at least some of the second-order concepts a creature possesses 
are inherently normative .
It is difficult to see, however, what such evidence could be . Imagine two 
creatures that are both complex enough to detect similarities and differences 
between kinds of utterances and respond differentially to them . one is a full-
blooded thinker; she possesses the inherently normative concepts of objective 
truth and falsity . She responds to utterances she takes to be true by saying 
“That’s true” and to ones she takes to be false by saying “That’s false .” The 
second creature is just like the first except that he is not a genuine thinker . 
He lacks an appreciation of the appearance/reality distinction, the concept 
of error, and the like, but is capable of reliably discriminating between those 
of others’ utterances that he would feel compelled to make under similar 
circumstances, and those he would not . He responds to utterances of the 
first type by saying “That’s true,” and to the second by saying “That’s false .” 
Suppose, further, that both creatures have the same “beliefs” in the sense 
that the utterances the second creature would feel compelled to make are the 
same as those that the first creature holds true . In such a case their behavior 
will be identical; there will be no way for an outside observer to to tell them 
apart .13
The moral of the example is this: in explaining mental normativity, what 
we need to account for is not the ability to categorize certain types of items 
(beliefs and utterances) but the ability to place items into a certain type of 
13 The fact that the creatures might apply these predicates to themselves, not just other 
speakers, makes no difference here . The second creature might well remember one of its past 
utterances, recognize that this is no longer an utterance it would feel compelled to make, and 
say of the utterance “That’s false .” But this would only be to discriminate between his past and 
future utterances, not to see the former as erroneous .
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category (inherently normative ones) . The difference between merely dis-
criminatory and inherently normative concepts, in other words, lies in their 
intension, not their extension . The extension of a concept, however, is all that 
could be captured in a series of causal interactions between an organism and 
its environment, all that could be gleaned from the patterns of behavior avail-
able to Davidsonian interpreters . Such an interpreter can, perhaps, identify 
which items in a creature’s surroundings prompt it to apply a certain concept, 
but the interpreter has no way of discerning why the creature so applies it . He 
cannot know what the creature’s reasons are for applying the concept, only the 
external causes of the application . In the example, the interpreter has no way 
of telling whether the creature says “true” in response to an utterance because 
she takes that utterance to reflect the way things stand in the objective world 
or only because it is relevantly similar to her own disposition . Whatever it is 
that separates merely discriminatory behavior from thinking – and Davidson 
assures us there must be something that does this – it is not something an in-
terpreter could discover by observing a creature’s causal interactions with its 
environment, even if this environment includes other creatures .
IV
Through most of the eighties and nineties, Davidson maintained the position 
we have been considering: that triangulation is capable of explaining how it is 
that normative predicates like “correct” and “incorrect” can be rightly applied 
to creatures that are only causally related to their surroundings . However, in 
two late essays – “Externalisms” (2001b), presented as part of a 1996 confer-
ence on his work, and “Comments on the Karlovy Vary Papers” (2001a), 
written in response to the the other papers presented at that conference – 
Davidson appears to back off of his earlier claim, defending instead a more 
cautious thesis about what triangulation can accomplish .
Davidson’s retreat from the original, “bold” version of triangulation to 
the cautious one results in large part from his recognition that phase two of 
the bold account is question-begging . He writes,
Mere similarity of response is obviously not enough for thought … not even 
when one animal’s responses to events and features of the world serve to touch 
off responses appropriate to those same events and features in other creatures . 
This triangular arrangement is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, of 
thought … What must be added to the basic triangle of two or more creatures 
interacting with each other through the mediation of the world if that interac-
tion is to support thought? The unhelpful answer is that the relation between 
the creatures must include linguistic communication … The reason this answer 
is not very helpful is that it assumes what was supposed to be explained . of 
course if there is language there is thought, so it cannot be easier to explain the 
former than the latter . (2001b, 13)
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In light of this realization, “triangulation” in the cautious account comes to 
refer only to the obtaining of the basic triangular arrangement (i .e ., to phase 
one of the bold account) . and thus Davidson no longer claims that triangu-
lation is a necessary and sufficient condition for thought . It is, he contends, 
only necessary . In fact, he now recognizes that no non-question-begging ele-
ments could be added to the basic triangular arrangement that would make it 
sufficient . He explains, “If it [triangulation] or it in addition to any non-in-
tensionally described conditions, were sufficient as well as necessary, we could 
reduce the intensional to the extensional, and this is not, in my opinion, 
possible” (2001a, 293) .
This shift in Davidson’s thinking appears to be motivated by the very 
sorts of concerns we noted above, and insofar as the cautious theory is im-
mune to these, the change is for the better . However, the change is also tanta-
mount to an admission that Davidson has no viable response to McDowell’s 
critique . If neither the intentional nor the intersubjective features of belief are 
sufficient to secure the applicability of normative concepts to our thinking, 
then what does secure it? Davidson offers the salutary suggestion that “what 
further progress we can make” in answering this question “will be in the di-
rection of theory building within the realm of the rational, not reduction of 
that realm to anything else” (2001b, 13) . But Davidson needs more than the 
hope for a future theory here . The rule-following paradox appears to show 
that, so long as we conceive of intentionality as merely causal, no explana-
tion of normativity is possible, no matter which “realm” we try to construct 
it in . and with the shift to the cautious version of triangulation, the paradox 
remains unresolved .14 The rule-following paradox, in other words, makes the 
very point that McDowell’s critique hinges on: that a causal view of inten-
tionality is incompatible with Doxastic Normativity . But after abandoning 
the bold theory of triangulation, Davidson has no response to this charge .
Perhaps unsurprisingly, McDowell argues that the critical claim he raises 
against Davidson is the same point that Wittgenstein himself intended to 
make with the rule-following paradox . McDowell argues that any attempt to 
find in Wittgenstein a “solution” to the paradox – be it the “sceptical” solu-
14 We may note that this gives us reason to doubt the truth of the cautious account, not 
just its effectiveness in responding to McDowell . according to the original, bold theory, the 
reason for supposing that triangulation was necessary for thought was that “there is no other 
way to answer Wittgenstein’s question, in what consists the difference between following a 
rule, and actually following it” (2005, 274), and the cautious theory does not include any new 
arguments to this effect . But if triangulation is not a sufficient condition for thought, then 
it does not answer Wittgenstein’s question . (In fact, as I argued above, it does not even move 
us closer to an answer; it only helps “explain” second-order discriminations, not normative 
concepts .) What reason, then, do we have to suppose that triangulation is even a necessary 
condition for thought? I find no answer to this question in Davidson’s work .
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tion Kripke (1982) endorses, or the “straight” solution offered by Davidson’s 
bold theory of triangulation – misses the point of Wittgenstein’s reflections . 
The real lesson Wittgenstein is urging, rather, is that we ought to reject the 
thesis that generates the paradox in the first place: the idea that intentional 
mental states “just stand there like a sign-post” – that is, that such states do 
not stand in a relationship to the external world that is intrinsically normative, 
but acquire their normative features only upon being interpreted (McDowell 
1998, 264) . This, as we have seen, is exactly what Davidson’s causal account 
of intentionality entails . The state one is in when one believes that p, when 
considered simply on its own, is merely a disposition to respond differentially 
to certain stimuli, and the notions of error and accord to not apply to it . 
on McDowell’s reading, Wittgenstein’s aim in articulating the rule-following 
paradox is to reveal that this “sign-post” picture of the contents of conscious-
ness leads to absurd conclusions and thus ought to be rejected . Davidson, 
then, is right to follow Wittgenstein in recognizing that an isolated creature 
who is only causally related to its surroundings cannot have thoughts, but the 
conclusion Davidson draws from this is neither Wittgensteinian, nor correct . 
The problem with the creature is not that he is isolated, but that he is only 
causally related to his surroundings .
Conclusion
Davidson never argues for the thesis that the mind-world relationship is 
merely causal . He simply asserts that it is “obvious” that this is the case, and 
moves on to drawing out its coherentist implications .15 Somewhat ironically, 
perhaps, I want to close by suggesting that the real “reason” for Davidson’s 
adherence to this view of intentionality is not a justifier, but only a cause: the 
influence of Quine . To be sure, Davidson took a number of important steps 
beyond Quine’s dogmatic naturalism, many of them intended to rehabilitate 
the strong sense of objectivity that is embodied in Doxastic Normativity . 
Nevertheless, for all of his re-working of the Quinean picture, Davidson never 
questioned the basic idea that thinking is, at bottom, a matter of respond-
ing to stimuli . McDowell’s contention is that Davidson cannot have it both 
ways: he cannot have the kind of objectivity and normativity he wants while 
leaving this vestige of Quinean naturalism intact . The fact that triangulation 
fails to reconcile these two strands of Davidson’s thinking, of course, does not 
mean that no reconciliation is possible . But the deep-seated reasons why tri-
angulation fails suggest that the prospects are quite dim . The force McDow-
15 Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (2005, chap . 22) also identify this as a fundamental, 
undefended assumption of Davidson’s thought, though they discuss it in slightly different 
terms . 
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ell’s critique thus reaches beyond Davidson . It poses a significant challenge to 
any attempt to understand mental content in causal terms .16
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